It is necessary to use profiling to prevent terrorist strikes on transport hubs, and impossible to avoid allegations of bias

We shall start with a comment that originally appeared in the Youth Forum background paper.

"Supporters of profiling point out that seasoned security officers’ ability to identify dangerous individuals by their behaviour is all but useless within a busy airport. It is not possible for a handful of officers to focus sufficient attention on each of the millions of passengers that pass through Kennedy, LAX or Heathrow, nor is it possible to hire and train enough staff to close this gap. By eliminating the types of passenger thought least likely to be terrorists, the skills and insight of experienced officers can be employed more effectively."

Police and security officers function best when they are able to usey their experience and training to scrutinise the conduct of individuals - to examine individual behaviour. Even the best trained terrorist is likely to conduct themselves differently before carrying out an attack. Often, we significantly over estimate the competence and outward normality of terror suspects. Interviews conducted with individuals who came into contact the 9/11 hijackers in the months and weeks building up to the attack noted that they occassionally made cryptic, yet clearly threatening statements relating to their religious beliefs and the American government. Umar Adbullmutallab boarded the plane that he attempted to destory on 2009 carrying a one way ticket. He informed a border control official that he was travelling to attend a "religious ceremony".

However, even the obvious cues described above can become obscured in an environment containing thousands of people travelling to hundreds of destinations. Our security officers find themselves at a disadvantage. Their attention needs to be focussed in someway. When deciding airport security policy, it is necessary to use heuristic principles.

Crucially for the argument that was discussed in the background paper, many of the guiding principles used to direct security official's attention on to passengers who were more likely to pose a risk to a flight were based on their behaviour and travel activities rather than their backgrounds and identity. An individual who has repeatedly flown in an out of Sudan, Pakistan and Yemen, and whose travel is paid for by a third party can be reasonably assumed to be more likely to have associations with dangerous groups in those countries than someone making their first foray to France. In this scenario, of course, likelyhood is no indicator of guilt - only a useful tool in guiding the attention of security officials.