The first bomb, on Hiroshima was sufficient to achieve the objective of surrender without the use of the second bomb after only a very short period of time. There was only three days between the two bombings, an unpardonably short period. Communications between Hiroshima and Tokyo had unsurprisingly been severed, so the full effect had yet to sink in on some policy makers by the time ‘Fat Man’ was dropped. It had however already convinced Foreign Minister Togo, Prime Minister Suzuki and crucially the Emperor himself. He said upon hearing the news of Hiroshima:  “Now that things have come to this impasse, we must bow to the inevitable. ... We should lose no time in ending the war so as not to have another tragedy like this.”[1] The rest of the cabinet was as yet unmoved, but even if they had been it is unlikely they would have been able to actually surrender before the second bomb was dropped.

There were significant other factors in play as well. Before the second bomb was dropped the Japanese had learnt of the Soviet attack which dashed their last hopes of mediation for a favourable settlement and they were not optimistic of their chances in that conflict, even the army’s planners expected Manchukuo’s capital Changchun would fall in two weeks.[2] Although the Cabinet was deadlocked 3 to 3 this was the case both before and after the news of Nagasaki came in, the point of fact that the US had more than one bomb although a shock to those opposed to surrender did not alter their position. Ultimately the Emperor was forced to intervene on the side of the proponents of peace, his mind had been made up even before the first bomb. It is arguable that Hiroshima was necessary to push him into acting, which was unprecedented but the Nagasaki bombing was entirely superfluous. Historian Sadao Asada’s opinion is that the second bomb was unnecessary.[3]

It is conventional to argue that Japan was defeated already and so the bombings were unnecessary as Sadao Asada points out this confuses defeat with surrender. However such a position seems equally to confuse surrender with peace. That there had to be an unconditional surrender seems almost unquestioned. Most wars do not end in an unconditional surrender of one side or the other, Japanese defeat was plain so a negotiated peace would normally have been set in motion when the US saw the terrible casualties it might be forced to take in its push for total victory. The Americans learnt of Japanese willingness to negotiate in July, on the 13th Secretary of the Navy Forrestal wrote in his diary “The first real evidence of a Japanese desire to get out of the war came today... Togo said further that the unconditional surrender term of the Allies was about the only thing in the way of termination of the war”[1] Stimson, Grew and Forrestal aimed at persuading president Truman to offer the Japanese promise of the preservation of the monarchy as an alternative to unconditional surrender.[2] Ultimately the Potsdam declaration set the unconditional surrender policy in stone.[3] Offering such a condition would certainly have strengthened the peace party within the Japanese cabinet and allowed them to present further resistance by the generals and admirals as endangering the monarchy.[4] However, on its own this would probably not have lead to peace, the cabinet would still have been split 3-3 with the Army and Navy ministers both opposed and with vetoes on policy. Even the most belligerent of the Japanese Cabinet, Army Minister Anami’s conditions were preservation of the Imperial institution, no military occupation of the home islands, Japanese forces were to demobilize and disarm themselves and war criminals were to be prosecuted by the Japanese themselves.[5] While these conditions are obviously ripe for exploitation, would they really disarm and try war criminals? they are not unreasonable. Just because there was no hope that the US would accept these conditions, they fly in the face of the Potsdam Declaration from which the allies would not deviate, does not mean that another alternative to unconditional surrender should not be considered as an alternative to the dropping of the Nuclear bombs.

The use of the Atomic bomb raised immediate moral questions as to its use.

Albert Einstein argued “The American decision [to use the bomb] may have been a fatal error, for men accustom themselves to thinking a weapon which has been used once can be used again... [on the other hand] Our renunciation of this weapon as too terrible to use would have carried great weight”[1] So far Einstein has been proved wrong and the precedent thus set has not been followed. That the bombs are ‘to terrible to use’ does seem to have sunk in.

The use of the bombs was also illegal as it would have breached the Hague conventions of 1899 and 1907, signed by the US. Of Hague IV The Laws and Customs of War on Land it probably breached   articles 23, forbidding the use of weapons that cause ‘unnecessary suffering’, and article 25 forbidding the attack of undefended towns. It would certainly by its indiscriminate nature have breached article 27 “In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not being used at the time for military purposes”[2] as well as the attendant declaration forbidding attack from aircraft!

Clearly such sections forbidding attack from aircraft, or balloons in the 1899 version make the Hague convention seem antiquated but the laws of war in general remain even now as they were codified in 1907.[3] The International Court of Justice has referred back to these precedents “In the view of the vast majority of states as well as the writers there can be no doubt as to the applicability of humanitarian law to nuclear weapons. The Court shares that view.”[4] That humanitarian law included the Hague conventions.  The court reconfirmed the view that “States must never make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets”[5] It is noteworthy that dissensions from a position of banning the use of nuclear weapons entirely focus on the possible use with minimal civilian casualties.[6] Since the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings did not attempt to minimize civilian casualties the implication is that their use was illegal based upon the Hague conventions that were already in force.